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Abstract
We empirically study the use of value–based management systems in listed German ﬁrms and exam-
ine implications for ﬁrms’ stock market performance. Using a novel, hand–collected data set covering
1,083 ﬁrm years from 2002 to 2008, we ﬁnd that value–based management systems become increas-
ingly common. Speciﬁcally, in 2008 42% of our sample ﬁrms have implemented such a system. In
the empirical analysis, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that implement value–based management systems earn sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and economically substantial abnormal stock market returns measured within a
two-year adoption phase. These excess returns are not jeopardized by poor post-adoption returns. In
the analysis, we carefully control for risk and account for endogeneity concerns. Overall, our ﬁndings
support the view that shareholders consider the adoption of a value–based management system as a
credible signal that management will focus on shareholder interests and that such systems actually
increase shareholder value.
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1 Introduction
Value–based management systems rely on performance indicators that combine traditional
accounting–based measures of ﬁrm performance with performance expectations of sharehold-
ers (e.g. Ryan and Trahan, 2007).1 Thus, with the increasing acceptance of the shareholder value
principle, value-based management (VBM) systems have received much interest among man-
agers, consultancy ﬁrms, and the ﬁnancial press. Surprisingly, however, solid empirical evi-
dence on the adoption of of VBM systems and the implications for ﬁrm performance — and
more precisely for shareholders — is rather scare. With this paper, we aim to narrow this gap
by studying the use of VBM systems in German listed ﬁrms and examining implications for the
ﬁrms’ stock market performance.
Today, shareholder value maximization is a commonly accepted goal of listed ﬁrms. Ac-
cordingly, any appropriate monitoring and incentive metric should consider investors’ return
expectations when evaluating managerial decisions. This is exactly what VBM metrics do:
By considering returns (from invested capital) and the cost of invested capital simultaneously,
VBM metrics bridge the gap between traditional — generally accounting–based — measures
of ﬁrm performance and return expectations of investors. In other words, VBM metrics bring
together accounting–oriented costs of operations, on the one hand and investors’ opportunity
cost of capital on the other. Thus, VBM metrics may constitute the basis for an economically
meaningful integrated management strategy and ﬁnancial control system (e.g. Ryan and Trahan,
2007). Now, while this might rationalize why VBM systems have gained increasing interest, ev-
idence on whether ﬁrms that adopt VBM systems are rewarded by superior ﬁrm performance
is scarce and inconclusive. Thus, many authors ask for more research on that issue (e.g. Davies,
2000; Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Lueg and Schäﬀer, 2010).
To gain (further) insights into the performance implications of VBM systems, we study a
broad set of 178 German listed ﬁrms over a period from 2002 to 2008. Therefore, we carefully
screen the annual reports of these ﬁrms and code information on whether or not a particular
ﬁrm has implemented a VBM system. Note, that a natural way to study the issue is found in
a classical event study design (see Kothari and Warner, 2006 for a discussion of the event study
method). However, in the context of VBM systems it is quite diﬃcult to identify an eﬀective
event date, i.e. the date where the implementation of the VBM system becomes public for the
1We deﬁne value–based management systems as all types of integrated management strategy and ﬁnancial control
systems that rely on a metric which considers return (on invested capital) and the cost – or at least the amount – of
invested capital simultaneously. We call the latter a value–based management metric.
2ﬁrst time (and in a credible manner). This becomes obvious, if one envisions the process of
implementing such a management and control system in a (large) organization. And in fact,
when we checked whether we can ﬁnd ad-hoc announcements or news clippings on ﬁrm’s
implementing VBM systems or even changing their management control system, we could not
ﬁnd any reliable (and simultaneously usable) event. Therefore, we argue that a systematic
annual report search is the best research strategy to consistently identifying whether or not a
ﬁrm has implemented a VBM system.2
The annual report search gives us 1,083 ﬁrm year observations, for which we collect a va-
riety of additional data. We then examine implications of the adoption of VBM systems on a
ﬁrm’s stock market returns. We focus on stock market returns as a performance measure for
two reasons: First, it provides a direct measure for shareholder wealth eﬀects (e.g. Kothari and
Warner, 2006). Second, it is less exposed to endogeneity concerns, since the ﬁrm-speciﬁc per-
formance level is supposed to be reﬂected in the current valuation level.From a methodological
perspective, we then proceed in two steps. First, we conduct a rather basic event study and sec-
ond, we use regression analysis to examine performance implications of VBM systems. From
a conceptual point of view, we argue that VBM systems help to remind managers of share-
holder’s interests. Adopting that view, VBM systems represent an eﬀective mechanism to align
interests of shareholders and managers. In line with this argument, we then hypothesize that
the adoption of VBM systems is rewarded by superior stock market performance.
Analyzing the data, we observe an increasing propensity to implement a VBM system sys-
tem: While in 2002 only one fourth of our sample ﬁrms have adopted a VBM systems, in 2008
42% of our sample ﬁrms have. Moreover, we ﬁnd substantial size eﬀects: In 2008 87% of our
largestﬁrmshaveadoptedaVBMsystem. Whenweexaminetheimplicationsforstockreturns,
we ﬁnd that that ﬁrms which adopt VBM systems in fact earn superior stock market returns
duringtheadoptionphase. Theseexcessreturns,whicharecarefullyadjustedforrisk,arestatis-
tically signiﬁcant and economically substantial. Moreover, these returns are not jeopardized by
poor post-adoption returns and are robust against endogeneity concerns regarding the timing
of the adoption. Overall, our ﬁndings support the view that shareholders consider the adop-
tion of a value–based management system as a credible signal that management will focus on
shareholder interests and that such systems actually increase shareholder value.
2Note, that our arguments are similar to the ones found in Dittmann, Maug and Schneider (2009), who study
the eﬀect of bankers on boards. Moreover, note that screening the annual reports our sample is not aﬀected by a
potential response bias as most other studies on VBM are, since they use survey data (see also the discussion in
Lueg and Schäﬀer, 2010).
3We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we directly examine implica-
tions for shareholder wealth. Prior literature generally analyzes the eﬀect of VBM systems on
operating performance using accounting ﬁgures (e.g. Ryan and Trahan, 2007). Operating perfor-
mance measures, however, are problematic since managers have some discretion with respect
to accounting ﬁgures, e.g. timing of earnings (see Lev (1989), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995),
Sloan (1996) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) for general discussions of earnings management.) Sec-
ond, our analysis is based on a comprehensive panel data set that allows a thorough economet-
ric analysis. This is an important issue, since the analysis of performance eﬀect poses serious
econometric problems (e.g. Börsch–Supan and Köke, 2002). In line with that Lueg and Schäﬀer
(2010, p. 2) argue that ill-deﬁned data sets and methodological issues impair most of the exist-
ing analyses of VBM systems. Finally, we provide evidence on the adoption of VBM systems
outside the Anglo–Saxon region. While the existing literature mainly focuses on US ﬁrms, we
provide evidence of the adoption and the eﬀects of VBM systems in Germany. Germany is
known for its bank– and insider–oriented governance system with rather weak shareholder
protection and is famous for its more equitable Rhine Capitalism. Generally, Germany is con-
sidered to be less shareholder oriented and thus provides an interesting setting for an analysis
of VBM systems (e.g. Böhmer, 2002; Goergen, Manjon and Renneboog, 2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the data set and Section 4 discusses the distribution of VBM systems in
Germany. Section 5 examines the eﬀects of VBM systems on ﬁrms’ stock market performance,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The VBM approach aims to provide an integrated strategy and control system in order to cre-
ate superior value for shareholders (e.g. Ameels, Bruggeman and Scheipers, 2003; Ryan and Trahan,
2007). While Ittner and Larcker (2001) provide an extensive survey, the origins of the VBM ap-
proachdatebackalmostthreedecadeswhenRappaportestablishedthemanagementdoctrineof
shareholdervalue(e.g.Rappaport,1981). ThefundamentalideaofRappaport’sshareholdervalue
approach is to align internal corporate goals with shareholders interest of value maximization
in order to mitigate agency costs in publicly listed ﬁrms caused by the increasing separation
of ownership and control. Since then, there has been a steadily increasing tendency to focus
on shareholder value concepts in corporate management. As a result a large number of VBM
4systems have been developed (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Ryan and Trahan, 2007; Lueg and Schäf-
fer, 2010) and there is evidence that after the adoption of a VBM system investment behavior of
ﬁrms changes (e.g. Balachandran, 2006).
In concept, VBM systems are built on several pillars that provide a consistent basis to evalu-
ate, monitor and control managerial decisions over time (e.g. Malmi and Ikaheimo, 2003; Ameels,
Bruggeman and Scheipers, 2003). The key element of VBM systems is the fact that they rely on a
metric which considers returns and the cost of invested capital simultaneously.3 Accordingly,
VBM systems link the two fundamentals of value creation: The returns generated by the ﬁrm’s
assets and the resources necessary to ﬁnance these assets. Thus, many commentators — in
particular from consulting companies — argue that VBM systems may improve managerial
decision making by identifying which investment alternatives create or destroy value: To cre-
ate value, companies must generate returns on invested capital that exceed the cost of capital.
They argue that VBM systems help to remind managers of shareholder’s interests and thus
create shareholder value. Essentially, VBM proponents claim that VBM systems represent an
eﬀective mechanism to align interests of shareholders and managers.
While from a conceptual point of view properly designed VBM metrics seem to provide a
promisingbasisforavalue-enhancingmanagementandstrategytool, thequestionwhetherthe
adoptionofaVBMsystemactuallyimprovesﬁrmperformanceisanempiricalone. Andinfact,
as Ittner and Larcker (2001) and Lueg and Schäﬀer (2010) point out the question whether actually
implemented VBM systems can keep the conceptual promise of increasing ﬁrm performance is
one of the most fundamental issues in VBM research. However, in spite of the rising number of
ﬁrmsadopting VBMsystemsand theincreasing attentionofresearchers andthe ﬁnancialpress
solid empirical evidence on implications for ﬁrm performance and stock market returns is still
very limited. This is quite surprising, especially considering that the primary goal of the VBM
approach is to create superior long–term value for shareholders (e.g. Stern, Stewart and Chew,
1995; Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 2000).4
Notable exceptions are Athanassakos (2007), Ryan and Trahan (2007) and Hogan and Lewis
(2005). Examining Canadian ﬁrms, Athanassakos (2007) ﬁnds that ﬁrm with a VBM system earn
higher stock market returns. Ryan and Trahan (2007) use an event–study approach to study
3Ameels, Bruggeman and Scheipers (2003) provide a nice survey of commonly used VBM metrics.
4There are several studies investigating the explanatory power of VBM metrics for shareholder value. The re-
sults of these studies are, however, also inconclusive. For instance, while Stern, Stewart and Chew (1995) and O’Byrne
(1996) ﬁnd that VBM metrics outperform traditional accounting measures when explaining stock returns, other
studies do not ﬁnd much evidence for that, neither in the Anglo–Saxon area (e.g. Biddle, Bowen and Wallace (2005) or
Dodd and Chen (1996)) nor the European area Kyriazis and Anastassis (2007).
5eﬀects for residual income of US ﬁrms and ﬁnd that ﬁrm performance signiﬁcantly improves
aftertheadoptionofaVBMsystem. HoganandLewis(2005)showthatcompaniesusingresidual
income-based compensation plans have improved shareholder value creation after the imple-
mentation. Though, results do nor diﬀer from a set of non-adopting control ﬁrms.
All studies, however, are limited in various ways. First, the studies of Athanassakos (2007)
and Ryan and Trahan (2007) are based on survey data. Thus, both studies are faced with the
standard selection bias problem. To overcome this problem, we adopt the research approach
of Lovata and Costigan (2002) and collect our data from annual reports. Second, the analysis in
Athanassakos (2007) is a pure cross–sectional analysis based on a sample of 39 respondents. To
overcome the standard endogeneity concern of such studies, we collect an extensive panel data
set and employ econometric methods that allows us to make use of the time–series dimension
of our data set. Third, the study of Ryan and Trahan (2007) measures ﬁrm performance in terms
of residual income. However, it is still an open issue whether residual income by itself is linked
to shareholder value creation, which is the ultimate goal of any VBM system. Moreover, an
improvement in residual income after adopting a VBM system may not only be due to an en-
hancement of operating activities within the ﬁrm but also due to earnings management and
other accounting issues. To overcome these problems, we take a rather direct approach and
examine the eﬀect of the adoption of VBM systems upon a ﬁrm’s stock market performance.
Fourth, the study of Hogan and Lewis (2005) concentrates on companies using residual income-
based compensation plans, similar to studies of Wallace (1997) and Kleiman (1999). Therefore,
we expand this approach and examine all companies using VBM systems irrespective of its
type, e.g. economic proﬁt, cash value added or cash ﬂow return on investment. Further, our
study is not limited to residual income-based compensation plans, rather we include all com-
panies using a management control system considering return on investment and its cost of
capital.
3 Sample selection and data collection process
In this section we discuss the sample selection and our data collection process. Descriptive
statistics for our variables are then found in Table 2 in Section 4.
63.1 Sample selection
We deﬁne our sample as the set of all ﬁrms that have been listed in one of the four major Ger-
man stock indices (DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX) during the sample period. We deﬁne
the sample sample period as 2002 to 2008.5 To avoid survivorship bias, ﬁrms qualify for our
analysis in case that they have been listed in one of the indices once during the sample period.
Accordingly, we collect for each of the indices the list of constituents at the end of each year
in the sample period and identify the corresponding ﬁrms.Firms with stocks listed in one of
these four indices have to comply with the Prime Standard regulations and attract signiﬁcant
media and analyst coverage.6 Accordingly, we expect these ﬁrms to oﬀer the highest degree of
transparency regarding management strategy and control systems.
Based on the constituent lists, we identify 236 equity securities that have been listed in on of
thefourindicesduringoursampleperiod. Adoptingstandardprocedures, solelynon-ﬁnancial
Germanﬁrmsqualifyforoursample. Accordingly,weeliminate20securitieswithforeignISIN,
two securities due to double listings (i.e. the corresponding ﬁrm is listed in the indices with
common and preferred stocks), and 36 securities of ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
This procedure leaves us with a ﬁnal sample of 178 securities and 178 corresponding ﬁrms.
Givenoursampleperiodofsevenyears, thiscorrespondsto1,246ﬁrmyearobservations. How-
ever, in 142 of these cases ﬁrms are not listed or do not complying with the Prime Standard
regulations, so we eliminate these observations. Moreover, for 21 ﬁrm year observations (i.e.
some 2% of observations) we are unable to ﬁnd publicly available annual reports. Accordingly,
our ﬁnal sample consists of 1,083 ﬁrm year observations. Table 1 summarizes the sample con-
struction.
3.2 Data collection process
We now describe the data collection process. Thereby, we distinguish between stock returns,
standard ﬁrm characteristics and information on whether ﬁrms use VBM systems. While the
former two are rather easily accessible through commercial databases, there is no primary
5The German stock indices have been restructured early 2003. We use the early 2003 constituents lists for the
year 2002. This index restructuring represents a natural starting point, since there exists no similar classiﬁcation
structure prior to 2002.
6In EU countries, ﬁrms can generally choose between two diﬀerent points of access to equity capital markets.
Beside the EU–regulated market most exchanges also oﬀer a market regulated by themselves. The two markets diﬀer
with respect to legal basis and status but also with respect to transparency requirements. Within the EU–regulated
market the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FWB — Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse), which is the most relevant German
stock exchange, allows ﬁrms to list in one of two diﬀerent market segments. While ﬁrms only willing to fulﬁll the
EU–regulated minimum transparency level only have to list in the General Standard, ﬁrms opting for a listing in
the Prime Standard have to fulﬁll additional transparency requirements.
7Table 1: Sample description
PANEL A: Cross-sectional perspective
# ﬁrms
Equity securities listed in major stock indices (2002-2008) 236
- Foreign ISIN 20
- Double listings 2
- Financial institutions (ICB Classiﬁcation) 36
= Firms in ﬁnal sample 178
Panel B: Firm year perspective
# ﬁrm years
Maximum ﬁrm years for sample period (178 x 7 years) 1,246
- Years without listing in Prime Standard 142
- Missing annual reports 21
= Firm years in ﬁnal sample 1,083
Notes: The table describes our sample. While Panel A focuses on the cross–sectional perspective, Panel B also
considers the time dimension of our panel data set. Basically, we concentrate on German ﬁrms listed in one of the
four major German indices (DAX, MDAX, TecDAX and SDAX) and our sample period is 2002 to 2008. Within our
sample period 236 diﬀerent equity securities listed in one of the four stock indices. The corresponding non-ﬁnancial
German ﬁrms qualify for our sample. Accordingly, we eliminate 20 securities with Foreign ISIN, 2 securities due
to double listings (i.e. the corresponding ﬁrm is listed in the indices with common and preferred stocks), and 36
securities of ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This procedure leaves us with a ﬁnal sample of 178 securities and 178 corresponding
ﬁrms. Covering a sample period of seven years, this corresponds to 1,246 ﬁrm year observations. However, in 142
of them ﬁrms are not listed or do not complying with the Prime Standard regulations (the listing segment with
EU-regulated transparency standards). We eliminate these observations. Moreover, for 21 ﬁrm year observations
we are unable to ﬁnd publicly available annual reports. Accordingly, our ﬁnal sample consists of 1,083 ﬁrm year
observations.
8source of information on VBM and its implementation level in German ﬁrms. Accordingly,
we had to hand-collect this information.
Stock return data: Firm-speciﬁc stock return data is extracted from Thomson Datastream and
stock returns are calculated using the most liquid stock of the ﬁrm. However, according to
Ince and Porter (2006) on has to be careful with Datastream’s return data. Accordingly, we care-
fully examined these data. For instance, we skipped observations with zero return for ﬁve
subsequentmonth. Moreover,followingKothariandWarner(2006)along-termanalysisofstock-
returns requires careful adjustments for risk. To do so, we examine two types of excess returns
(explained below), which we calculate based on risk factors for the German market as reported
by Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2010).
Firm characteristics: We collect standard ﬁrm characteristics from Thomson Worldscope and
Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. Firm characteristics are used as control variables in our regression
analysis.
From Thomson Worldscope, we collect information on ﬁrm size (size), stock market val-
uation (market-to-book), operating performance (return on equity), diversiﬁcation levels (divers),
ﬁrmgrowth(growth),assetstructure(intangibility),RnD-intensity(rnd-ratio)andﬁnanciallever-
age (leverage). Speciﬁcally, we measure ﬁrm size as the logarithm of the book value of total as-
sets. Stock market valuation level is proxied by the market-to-book ratio of equity. Operating
performance is measured by return on equity. Diversiﬁcation is measured as 1 minus sales in
the largest business segment deﬂated by total sales of the ﬁrm and Firm growth is proxied by
the 2-years sales growth. Asset structure is measured by intangible assets deﬂated by total as-
sets and RnD-intensity by research and development expenditures deﬂated by sales. Financial
leverage is calculated as long-term debt to total assets. Finally, industry aﬃliation of ﬁrms is
determined according to ICB industries oﬀered by Dow Jones Indexes and FTSE.
Finally,wecollectinformationonownershipconcentration(freeﬂoat)fromHoppenstedtAk-
tienführer. All ﬁrm characteristics are explained in detail in Panel C in Table 6 in the appendix
and descriptives are found in Table 2 below.
Information on the use of VBM systems: Since there is (to the best of our knowledge) no
publicly accessible database with information on VBM and its implementation level in German
ﬁrms, we have to hand-collect this information. Our approach here is annual report research,
which diﬀerentiates us from most other studies on VBM systems (e.g. Ryan and Trahan (1999)
and Gleich, Sasse, Gräf and Kogler (2002) for an overview of German studies). This gives us two
9distinct advantages which stand out: First, our sample is not aﬀected by a potential response
bias, and second, we use the main source of capital market communication to identify whether
ﬁrms use a VBM system.
To collect the data, we carefully review each of the annual reports, in particular the man-
agement report, the ﬁnancials, the value management section, and the governance report. To
ensure consistency, we deﬁned decision rules ex ante. According to these criteria a company
has implemented a VBM system in a particular year, if an internal control system with an inte-
grated VBM metric is described and this measure is used as a target or controlling mechanism.
Thereby, we follow Ryan and Trahan (2007) and distinguish four types of VBM systems, accord-
ing to the underlying VBM metric:
Type 1:: Absolute ﬁgures on the basis of cash ﬂows including the discounted cash ﬂow model
and the cash value added (Rappaport, 1998).
Type2:: Absoluteﬁguresonthebasisofaccountingdatacalledresidualincomemeasuresthat
display excess earnings over a capital charge adjusted to ﬁrm’s risk (Young and O’Byrne, 2001).
Type 3:: Cash Flow Return on Investment as relative ﬁgure on the basis of cash ﬂows calcu-
lated as the diﬀerence between generated cash ﬂows and the economical capital consumption,
divided by total assets employed (Myers, 1996).
Type4:: RelativevalueorientedﬁguresonthebasisofaccountingdatalikeReturnonInvested
Capital or Return in Capital Employed. These measures do not directly consider the cost of
capital, but are typically compared to ﬁrm’s cost of capital in order to evaluative corporate
performance (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 2000).
If the VBM metric is one amongst several (non-VBM) metrics, we say that the ﬁrm has
adopted a VBM system. If, in contrast, a VBM metric is only mentioned as part of a key ﬁgures
overview, but is not speciﬁcally described in the annual report as a control mechanism, then
our rules say that the ﬁrm is to be classiﬁed as a non-adopter. We double-checked all cases and
carefully discussed problematic cases.
During our data collection process, we examine 1,083 annual reports and classify the corre-
sponding ﬁrm year observations on whether or not the corresponding ﬁrm has implemented
a VBM system. This information is coded in the dummy variable vbms, which takes the value
1 for ﬁrm years in which ﬁrm has implemented a management and control system relying on
a VBM metric.
Beyond the simple implementation dummy, we also examine whether ﬁrms just recently
10invented a VBM system. Speciﬁcally, for ﬁrms that have implemented a VBM system, we also
examine whether the ﬁrm has implemented the system in the current year or whether it was
already established the year before. We code this information in two dummy variables: While
vbms intro is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for ﬁrm years in which ﬁrms have imple-
mented a VBM system for the ﬁrst time (initial implementation), vbms established is a dummy that
takes the value 1 for ﬁrm years in which ﬁrms have implemented a VBM system but not for
the ﬁrst time. Obviously, we can only observe initial implementations only between the years.
Accordingly, since we only screen annual reports from 2002 to 2008, there are six time periods,
where we can observe initial implementations.
Our research approach is similar to the one used by Lovata and Costigan (2002), who also
collect their data from annual reports. Such an approach is based on two fundamental as-
sumptions: a) that ﬁrms that have implemented a VBM system are likely to mention this fact in
the annual report and b) that ﬁrms that report about the adoption of VBM systems, have actu-
ally implemented such a system. We are quite conﬁdent with respect to the latter presumption,
since reporting about the adoption of a VBM system without actually having implemented it,
would cause signiﬁcant legal liabilities for all board members and even the auditor. We accept
certain reservations with respect to our presumption a). However, there seems to be hardly a
reason why ﬁrms should hide the information of having adopted a VBM system. And even
if some ﬁrms might be inclined to keep secret the fact of the adoption of a VBM system, then
we accept that our approach will underestimate the likelihood of having implemented a VBM
system. Note that an approach that underestimates the actual likelihood of a VBM adoption
will also underestimate the eﬀect of VBM systems. Thus, our approach can be considered to be
rather conservative, not only from the perspective of estimating the likelihood of implementa-
tions but also with respect to the estimation of VBM eﬀects.
4 Value–based management systems in Germany
Inthissection, wereportevidenceontheadoptionofVBMsystemsinGermanlistedﬁrms. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the development of VBM systems within our sample. Overall, we observe that
in one third of our ﬁrm year observations, we observe that ﬁrms use a VBM system. Thereby,
we observe an increasing propensity to implement such systems: While in 2002 only one fourth
of ﬁrms classify as adopters, in 2008 42% of our sample ﬁrms do. These ﬁndings are in line with
the ﬁndings of Ruhwedel and Schultze (2002), Aders, Hebertinger, Schaﬀer, and Wiedemann (2003)
11and Homburg, Toksal, and Gödde (2004), Lueg (2008, 2010) and others. Based on survey data the
authors also ﬁnd increasing adoption of VBM systems in Germany listed ﬁrms.
Figure 1: Development of VBM systems within the sample
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Observations 150 150 149 157 160 161 156 1,083
VBMS = 0 74% 73% 72% 66% 64% 59% 58% 67%
VBMS = 1 26% 27% 28% 34% 36% 41% 42% 33%












Notes: The ﬁgure illustrates the development of VBM systems within the sample ﬁrms.
When we examine which ﬁrms actually implement VBM systems, we ﬁnd a substantial size
eﬀect, which is illustrated in Figure 2. While in 2008 87% of our DAX ﬁrms qualify as adopters,
only 17% (34%) of TecDax (SDAX) ﬁrms do.
This size eﬀect becomes even more transparent, when looking at the descriptive statistics
reported in Table 2. While Panel A reports means and medians for all ﬁrms, Panel B (C) re-
port means for ﬁrms without (with) VBM system, and Panel D t-values for a comparison of
corresponding means.
12Figure 2: VBM system implementations in the four indices
DAX MDAX TecDAX SDAX
Observations 24 42 23 36
















Notes: The ﬁgure illustrates the distribution of VBM system implementations across the four indices in 2008.
13Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C: Panel D:
All ﬁrms Firms Firms Comparison
without VBMS with VBMS of means
Variable Observations Mean Median Observations Mean Observations Mean t-value
vbms 1083 0.33 0.00 721 0.00 362 1.00 n/a
vbms intro 1083 0.03 0.00 721 0.00 362 0.10 n/a
vbms established 1083 0.30 0.00 721 0.00 362 0.90 n/a
size 1071 7.03 6.82 711 6.31 360 8.46 -19.90
****
market-to-book 1083 2.28 1.80 721 2.33 362 2.18 1.21
return on equity 1083 6.99 16.89 721 0.39 362 20.13 -2.63
***
divers 1054 0.35 0.35 694 0.30 360 0.44 -10.02
****
intangibility 1069 4.81 0.51 709 6.82 360 0.84 1.99
**
rnd-dummy 1083 0.68 1.00 721 0.62 362 0.80 -6.10
****
rnd-ratio 1079 0.10 0.01 717 0.13 362 0.02 2.11
**
growth 1036 1.68 1.24 677 1.89 359 1.29 4.52
****
leverage 1071 0.14 0.12 711 0.14 360 0.16 -2.40
**
free ﬂoat 1054 0.55 0.56 694 0.53 360 0.59 -3.72
****
masr 855 4.40 0.16 532 2.83 323 6.98 -1.59
rasr 838 1.29 -1.87 520 0.76 318 2.15 -0.49
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for all our variables. market-to-book and return on equity are winsorized (at the 1% level). Panel A reports mean and median
valuesof eachvariableforthe aggregatesample. Panel B(PanelC)reports meanvaluesofeach variableforﬁrm yearswithoutVBMS(with VBMS).PanelDreports t-values
for simple diﬀerence in mean tests. All variables are described in detail in Table 6. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ****, ***, **, and
*, respectively.
1
4With Panel B – D it becomes transparent that ﬁrms adopting a VBM system are signiﬁcantly
larger than non-adopters. This results holds even, when we use diﬀerent measures for ﬁrm size
(e.g. total sales, employees, or market capitalization). Moreover, the simple univariate tests
reveal that adopters have higher operating performance, are more diversiﬁed, but have less
intangibles in their balance sheet. Moreover, adopters show lower RnD-intensity and lower
growth rates. Similar, adopters are characterized by lower leverage and lower risk. However,
adopters have less concentrated ownership structure.
The last two variable (masr and rasr) are our two excess returns. While we will explain their
construction in Section 5.1 in detail, we already note here that in the simple mean-comparison
we do not observe any statistical signiﬁcant performance diﬀerences between adopting and
non-adopting ﬁrms.
For the subsequent analysis, we are particularly interested in initial implementations of
VBM systems (coded in our vbms intro dummy variable), since they allow us to disentangle the
adoption eﬀect of VBM systems from the general eﬀect of VBM systems. Figure 3 illustrates
that we observe 37 initial implementations. It is interesting to observe that we ﬁnd particularly
many new implementations in the years 2005 and 2007.
Figure 3: Initial reporting of VBM systems
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Observations 150 150 149 157 160 161 156 1,083







Notes: The ﬁgure illustrates the introduction of VBM systems within our sample ﬁrms.
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In this section, we examine implications of VBM systems on ﬁrms’ stock market performance.
We start with a discussion of our research strategy. To carefully account for risk, we follow a
two step approach. We ﬁrst calculate excess returns and use these excess returns for the em-
pirical analysis. Within the empirical analysis, we proceed in three steps. First, we we conduct
simple univariate tests of excess returns of ﬁrms initially implementing a VBM system. Sec-
ond, we perform standard regression analyses to gain further insights. Third, we examine the
robustness of our results by applying instrument variable methods.
5.1 Research strategy
WeareinterestedintheeﬀectofVBMsystemsontheﬁrm’sstockmarketperformance. Tostudy
this problem, we proceed in two steps: First, we conduct a rather basic event study for initial
implementations. Sincewecannotclearlyidentifyaneﬀectiveeventdate,wechoosetoexamine
a rather long event phase, which we will call adoption phase. Second, we use regression analysis
to examine performance implications of VBM systems in general. The regression analysis does
not only allow to check the robustness of our event study results but also to examine whether
possible performance eﬀects found in the event study analysis are subsequently jeopardized by
oﬀsetting post-adoption returns.
A central issue in the analysis of long-term stock returns is the issue of risk-adjustment
(e.g. Kothari and Warner, 2006; Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005). It is well know, that the cross-
section of stock returns is aﬀected by various factors (see Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997) for the US, and Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2010) for recent evidence from the German
stock market). Accordingly, our analysis has to account for these factors, no matter whether
they are actual risk factors or simply proxies for market anomalies (e.g. Kothari and Warner, 2006).
We carefully consider these factors by analyszing excess (or abnormal) returns instead of
unandjusted total shareholder returns in our analysis. Essentially, excess returns (ESRj;t) of a
stock j in period t is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the stock’s unadjusted total shareholder
return (TSRj;t) in that period and the corresponding expected return of the stock (ETSRj;t)
predicted by some model for stock price behavior, i.e.
ESRj;t = TSRj;t   ETSRj;t: (1)
While the literature knows various methods to calculate excess returns (e.g. Brown and
16Warner, 1980; Kothari and Warner, 2006; MacKinlay, 1997; or Kothari and Warner, 2006), we only
consider two measures of excess return:7
• The market-adjusted excess return is calculated as the diﬀerence between the ﬁrms’ stock re-
turn and the return of an investment in a broad portfolio of German non-ﬁnancial CDAX-
ﬁrms as calculated by Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2010) (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1980).
• Therisk-adjustedexcessreturniscalculatedasthediﬀerencebetweentheﬁrms’stockreturn
and the return of a Carhart (1997)-equivalent investment, i.e. an investment with the same
sensitivities to the four Carhart (1997)-risk factors (e.g. Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005).
To calculate the risk-adjusted excess return, we use the risk-factors of the German stock market
as calculated by Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2010) and determine sensitivities based on a three-
year estimation period.
From a conceptual perspective, the market-adjusted excess return relies on a simple market
model, while the risk-adjusted excess return relies on the analysis of Carhart (1997), which was
heavily inﬂuenced by the analysis of Fama and French (1993). The four factor model of Carhart
(1997)isthemostcompletecommonlyappliedfactormodelofassetpricing(e.g.Campbell,2000).
Accordingly, risk-adjusted excess returns seem more appropriate for the analysis than market-
adjusted returns. However, since even today various studies rely on a simple market model
(KothariandWarner,2006),toallowforcomparabilityofresultswealsoreportresultsformarket-
adjusted excess returns.
As already mentioned, we were able to identify 37 initial implementations. Unfortunately,
we face the problem, that we cannot clearly deﬁne an event as used in classical event-studies.
Accordingly, weexaminethestockpricebehavioroveranadoptionphase, whichwedeﬁneasthe
time interval spanning the ﬁscal year in which the ﬁrm initially implements the VBM system
plus the following ﬁscal year (see Figure 4).
With this idea in mind, we consider annualized returns over a two years horizons subse-
quently. More precisely, our variables of interest are
• the annualized market-adjusted stock return over two years, labeled masr, which is de-
ﬁned as the excess return of the ﬁrm’s stock compared to an investment in a broad port-
folio of German non-ﬁnancial CDAX-ﬁrms and
7See also Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Kothari and Warner (2006) for a
critical discussion methods to test long-run excess returns.
17Figure 4: Illustration of adoption phase
Notes: The ﬁgure illustrates the timing of the adoption phase.
• the annualized risk-adjusted stock return over two years, labeled rasr, which is deﬁned as
the excess return of the ﬁrm’s stock compared to a Carhart (1997)-equivalent investment
strategy.
With these variables, we then conduct a three-step empirical analysis. First, we use simple
univariate analyses to examine whether ﬁrms that initially implement a VBM system earn ex-
cess returns over the adoption phase. Second, we perform standard regression analyses to con-
ﬁrm the results of the univariate analysis and to gain further insights, speciﬁcally, concerning
post-adoption returns. Finally, we account for endogeneity concerns with respect to the tim-
ing of the adoption of VBM systems and re-examine the regression results using instrument
variable methods.
As we have seen already in Table 2 reporting descriptive statistics, in the univariate setting
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the excess performance of VBM adopting ﬁrms and
their counterparts, i.e. ﬁrms without a VBM system. However, whether this holds true for
the adoption phase or in a multivariate regression setting, is examined in Section 5.2 and 5.3,
respectively.
5.2 Simple univariate analysis
In the ﬁrst step of the empirical analysis, we examine whether ﬁrms that adopt a VBM system
earnsuperiorreturnsduringtheadoptionphase. Althoughweobserve37introductions,excess
returns are only feasible for 29 introductions. Table 3 reports average annualized excess returns
for these ﬁrms during the adoption phase. They amount to 8.99% in the case of the market-
18adjusted excess return masr and 13.17% in the case of the risk-adjusted excess return rasr.
Table 3: Univariate tests of stock returns during the introduction phase of VBMS
Method t-test Wilcoxon signed-rank test
Observations Mean t-value z-value
masr 29 8.99 1.92* 1.676*
rasr 29 13.17 3.28*** 2.822***
Notes: We report simple univariate tests of a ﬁrm’s stock price performance during the introduction phase of
VBMS. We identify 37 introduction phases within our sample. To capture the eﬀect of the introduction on the ﬁrm’s
stock price performance, we measure the ﬁrm’s stock return over two years: the year in which the ﬁrm introduces
the system and the successive year. We measure the ﬁrm’s stock price performance in two ways. First, we use masr,
an annualized 2-years market-adjusted stock return (in %) deﬁned as the excess return of the ﬁrm’s stock compared
to an investment in a broad portfolio of German non-ﬁnancial CDAX-ﬁrms as calculated by Hanauer, Kaserer and
Rapp (2010). Second, we use rasr, an annualized 2-years risk-adjusted stock return (in %) deﬁned as the excess
return of the ﬁrm’s stock compared to a Carhart (1997) equivalent investment. In the table we report average values
for masr and rasr for 29 introduction phases, for which we can observe masr and rasr. Moreover, we report t-values
for simple t-tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10%
level is indicated by ****, ***, **, and *, respectively.
A simple t-test reveals that both values are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This ﬁnding
is reinforced by the result of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. However, if we compare the excess
returns with the excess returns of all other ﬁrms in our sample (not reported here), then we
only ﬁnd statistical diﬀerences for the risk-adjusted excess return.
These ﬁndings provide ﬁrst evidence, that ﬁrms that adopt a VBM system are rewarded by
the stock market: shareholders seem to consider the adoption of a value–based management
system as a credible signal that management will focus on shareholder interests, which in turn
increases shareholder value.
5.3 Regression analysis
In the second step, we perform standard regression analyses. Thereby, the goal is twofold:
First, weaimtoconﬁrmtheﬁndingsfromtheunivariateanalysis. Second, weexaminewhether
we ﬁnd positive eﬀects beyond the adoption phase or whether the positive eﬀect of a VBMS-
adoption even disappears over time.
We examine these issues in a multivariate regression setting. Speciﬁcally, we follow Dey
(2008) and others and include the lagged performance measure on the right hand side of the
19regression equation. More precisely, we estimate the following model
ESR =  + 1  vbms intro + 2  vbms established + 0  lESR +
X
j
jXj + " (2)
where ESR (lESR) is the (lagged) excess stock return, vbms intro and vbms established are the
variablesdiscussedabove, X1; ;XJ representsthevectorofcontrolvariables, and"accounts
for the unexplained residual of the left hand side variable.8
Essentially, Model (2) examines, whether our variables of interest have explanatory power
(for a ﬁrm’s stock market performance) beyond the lagged endogenous variable and other con-
trols. As a robustness test, we also estimate a version of model (2) where all controll variables
are lagged one period. Such a model is a version of the adjusted Granger speciﬁcation as dis-
cussed by Dittmann, Maug and Schneider (2009).
The results reported in Table 4 conﬁrm the results from the above analysis: Firms earn sub-
stantial excess returns during the adoption phase. Depending on the model the excess return
duringthe2-yearadoptionphaseisfoundtobebetween10%(ModelSR.1)and16%p.a. (Model
SR.3). These ﬁgures are both statistical (highly) signiﬁcant and economically quite substantial.
Moreover, model SR.1 in the ﬁrst column of Table 4 suggests that VBMS-adopting ﬁrms are
also able to earn market-adjusted excess returns even after the adoption phase. However, the
analysis of risk-adjusted excess returns in model SR.2 and SR.3 reveals that while there might
be tendencies for positive eﬀects, they are hardly statistically signiﬁcant. Still, it is interesting
to note, that the adoption eﬀects are not jeopardized by poor post-adoption returns.
Robustness of results: In the third step, we challenge our previous ﬁndings taking into ac-
count endogeneity concerns with respect to the timing of the adoption of a VBM system. To
be more concrete, a critical commentator might raise the concern that the timing of the VBMS-
adoption is a discretionary decision of the ﬁrm’s own management. Speciﬁcally, the manage-
ment might want to establish a novel management and strategy tool, when it anticipates that
the ﬁrm will perform well in the future. A simple reason might be that changing the man-
agement system might allow the management to alter its compensation structures and thus it
might deliberately time the adoption of a VBM system. Obviously, in such a scenario standard
OLSmethodsasappliedinTable4wouldproducebiasedresults. Weaccountforsuchconcerns
8In Model (2) we use the common notation with a one-period lagged endogenous variable on the right hand
side (e.g. Dey, 2008). Note, however, that our performance period is 2 years, i.e. we measure masr and rasr over two
years. Now, since we use yearly observations in the regression speciﬁcations below, the right hand side variable
lESR in these speciﬁcations is actually lagged for two periods.
20Table 4: Explaining market-adjusted and risk-adjusted stock returns
Model SR.1 SR.2 SR.3
Dependent variable masr rasr rasr
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS
SE Method Clustered Robust Clustered Robust Clustered Robust
vbms intro 10.110** 14.628*** 16.137****
[2.29] [3.21] [3.56]










market-to-book [-1] -1.503 -0.724 -0.649
[-1.33] [-0.79] [-0.93]
return on equity 0.211**** 0.202****
[4.42] [3.56]






















free ﬂoat -5.483 -2.764
[-1.08] [-0.47]
free ﬂoat [-1] -4.891
[-0.76]
Industry eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 650 627 624
Firms 133 133 134
adj. R2 0.222 0.120 0.126
Notes: The table reports results of regression models explaining ﬁrms’ market- and risk-adjusted stock price per-
formance. We measure a ﬁrm’s stock return over two years, i.e. the current and the coming year and in two ways.
First, we use masr, a 2-year market-adjusted stock return (in %) deﬁned as the excess return of the ﬁrm’s stock com-
pared to an investment in a broad portfolio consisting of all German non-ﬁnancial CDAX-ﬁrms as calculated by
Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2010). Second, we use rasr, a 2-year risk-adjusted stock return (in %) deﬁned as the excess
return of the ﬁrm’s stock compared to a Carhart (1997) equivalent investment (monthly risk factors are taken from
Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2010) and sensitivities are determined on a 3-year estimation window). While model
SR.1 explains masr, model SR.2 and SR.3 explain rasr. Our primary variables of interest are vbms intro and vbms
established. vbms intro is a dummy variable indicating whether the ﬁrm has adopted a VBMS in the particular year
and vbms established indicates whether the ﬁrm has an established VBMS in place. In each of the models we follow
Dey (2008) and others and use the lagged endogenous variable as a right hand side variable, i.e. we ask whether
our variables of interest have explanatory power beyond the lagged endogenous variable. Moreover, in each of the
models we control for various ﬁrm characteristics as well as ﬁxed time and industry eﬀects. While model SR.1 and
SR.2 use current ﬁrm characteristics, in model SR.3 ﬁrm characteristics are lagged one period. Accordingly, model
SR.3 is a version of the adjusted Granger speciﬁcation as discussed by Dittmann, Maug and Schneider (2009). All
variables are described in detail in Table 6. We report Huber/White heteroscedasticity robust t-values that allow
for clustering on ﬁrm level in brackets. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ****,
***, **, and *, respectively.
21by applying instrument variable (IV) methods.9
Results of our IV-estimates are reported in Table 5.We estimate three models: Model SR.4
and SR.5 use a pooled approach with ﬁxed year and industry eﬀects and replicate model SR.1
and SR.2 from Table 4, where we follow Dey (2008) and others and use the lagged endogenous
variable as an additional right hand side variable. In contrast, model SR.6 uses a ﬁrm-ﬁxed ef-
fectsapproach. Allowingforﬁxedﬁrmeﬀects, weonlyusestandardﬁrmcharacteristicsanddo
not consider the lagged endogenous variable, since this would severely bias our SE estimates.
In all three models, we instrument our variable of interest vbms intro by vbms prop, which aims
to measure external pressure to implement a VBM system. More precisely, vbms prop is cal-
culated as the annual average degree of VBMS-implementation within the industry where the
ﬁrm itself is not considered, whenever the ﬁrm has not implemented a VBM system (and zero
otherwise). While the level of vbms prop is determined outside the ﬁrm by considering the im-
plementation level within the corresponding industry, it it has substantial explanatory power
for our variable of interest vbms intro in the ﬁrst stage regressions (corresponding z-values are
well above 10).
Again, the results of the IV-analysis support our previous ﬁndings: Firms that adopt a VBM
system earn substantial excess returns during the adoption phase and these eﬀects are not re-
versedsubsequently. WhilethecoeﬃcientsofinterestintheIV-modelsareactuallyevenhigher
than in the standard OLS regression, the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects model SR.6 conﬁrms the level of the
OLS estimate: There the risk-adjusted excess return is estimated to be close to the 10% to 16%
p.a. from the OLS estimates.
Overall, these ﬁndings reinforce the evidence found in the univariate analysis of adoption
returns that VBMS-adopting ﬁrms are rewarded by the stock market. Moreover, these adop-
tion eﬀects do not disappear over time suggesting that the adoption of a VBM system actually
increase shareholder value.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
VBM systems have generated increasing interest among managers, consultancy ﬁrms, and the
ﬁnancial press. Surprisingly, however, empirical evidence on the relationship between the
adoption of VBM systems and ﬁrm performance is scarce. With this study we aim to ﬁll that
gap: We empirically examine the eﬀect of VBM systems on ﬁrm performance, in particular on
9IV methods allow to circumvent the endogeneity problem. The challenge, however, is to ﬁnd an appropriate
instrument (see Wooldridge (2002) for a detailed discussion).
22Table 5: Explaining risk-adjusted stock returns using instrument-variable methods
Model SR.4 SR.5 SR.6
Dependent variable rasr rasr rasr
Estimation Method IVA IVA IVA-FFE
SE Method Clustered Robust Clustered Robust Jackknife
vbms intro 29.588**** 29.608**** 17.857*
[3.71] [3.72] [1.83]




size -0.569 -0.468 -35.495****
[-0.62] [-0.49] [-4.26]
market-to-book [-1] -0.590 -0.669 -6.119**
[-0.68] [-0.73] [-2.52]










leverage -9.876 -9.704 67.094**
[-1.13] [-1.12] [2.49]
free ﬂoat -3.702 -3.880 -34.391***
[-0.63] [-0.66] [-2.75]
Instrument(s) rasr [-2], vbms prop vbms prop
vbms prop
Industry eﬀects Yes Yes No
Firm eﬀects No No Yes
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 623 623 824
Firms 133 133 140
adj. R2 n/a n/a n/a
Notes: The table reports results of regression models using the instrument variable approach to explain ﬁrms’ risk-
adjusted stock price performance rasr, which is deﬁned as the excess return (in %) of the ﬁrm’s stock compared to a
Carhart(1997)equivalentinvestmentovertwoyears. Ourprimaryvariableofinterestisvbmsintro,whichisadummy
variable indicating whether the ﬁrm has adopted a VBMS in the particular year. We use an instrument variable
approach (IVA) to account for possible endogeneity concerns with respect to the timing of the introduction of the
VBMS. Our instrument is vbms prop, which aims to measure external pressure to implement a VBM system. More
precisely, vbms prop is calculated as the annual average degree of VBMS implementation within the industry where
theﬁrmitselfisnotconsidered,whenevertheﬁrmhasnotimplementedaVBMsystem(andzerootherwise). Model
SR.4 uses a pooled approach with ﬁxed year and industry eﬀects and replicates model SR.3 from Table 4, where
we follow Dey (2008) and others and use the lagged endogenous variable as a right hand side variable, i.e. we ask
whether our variable of interest has explanatory power beyond the lagged endogenous variable. In contrast, model
SR.5usesaﬁrm-ﬁxedeﬀectsapproach. Allowingforﬁxedﬁrmeﬀects, weonlyusestandardﬁrmcharacteristicsand
do not consider the lagged endogenous variable, since this would severely bias our SE estimates. All variables are
described in detail in Table 6. We report Huber/White heteroscedasticity robust t-values that allow for clustering
on ﬁrm level in brackets for model SR.4-5 and Jacknife standard errors for model SR.6. Statistical signiﬁcance at the
0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ****, ***, **, and *, respectively.
23ﬁrms’ stock market returns. We focus on stock market returns as a performance measure for
two reasons: First, it provides a direct measure for shareholder wealth eﬀects, second, it is less
exposed to endogeneity concerns, since the ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance level is supposed to be
reﬂected in the current valuation level.
To examine our research questions, we use a novel hand–collected panel data set covering
1,083 ﬁrm years of large German ﬁrms between 2002 and 2008. Carefully screening annual
reports of our sample ﬁrms, we ﬁnd an increasing propensity to implement a VBM system
system: While in 2002 only one fourth of our sample ﬁrms have adopted a VBM systems, in
2008 42% of our sample ﬁrms have. Moreover, we ﬁnd substantial size eﬀects: In 2008 87% of
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed in the DAX have adopted a VBM system.
Assuming that VBM systems are an eﬀective governance mechanism to align interests of
shareholders and managers, we hypothesize that the adoption of VBM systems is rewarded by
superiorstockmarketperformance. Intheempiricalanalysis, wethenﬁndthatﬁrmswhichuse
VBM systems in fact earn abnormal stock market returns. These returns, which are carefully
adjusted for risk, are statistically signiﬁcant and economically substantial: Depending on the
model the excess return during the 2-year adoption phase is found to be between 10% (Model
SR.1) and 16% p.a. (Model SR.3). Moreover, these returns are not jeopardized by poor post-
adoptionreturns. Moreover,theyarerobustagainstendogeneityconcernsregardingthetiming
of the adoption.
In sum, we conclude that our ﬁndings support the view that shareholders consider the
adoptionofavalue–basedmanagementsystemasacrediblesignalthatmanagementwillfocus
on shareholder interests and that such systems actually improve shareholder value.
However, we also note that our analysis has some limitations and leaves some question un-
resolved. First, our analysis is outside-in and we cannot diﬀerentiate between various levels of
VBMS-implementation. It would be interesting to see, whether various degrees of implemen-
tation levels, e.g. whether or not management compensation is linked to the VBM metric, aﬀect
ﬁrm performance in diﬀerent ways. Second, our analysis does not examine the way how man-
agerial decision making in VBMS-adopting ﬁrms diﬀers from their counterparts. Thus, further
researchisneededtounderstandwhetherﬁrmdecisions, e.g. payoutdecisionsormoregeneral
capital allocation within the ﬁrm, of VBMS-adopting ﬁrms are superior. Finally, critical com-
mentators might argue that its not the adoption of a VBM system, but the adoption of any rea-
sonable management and strategy tool, which drives our results. While this arguments seems
unreasonable to us, since also non-adopting ﬁrms in our sample might have implemented a
24management and strategy tool, further research is needed to convince critics. In sum, all three
points provide fruitful avenues for further research.
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A Deﬁnition of variables
28Table 6: Deﬁnition of variables
Variable Description Source
Panel A: VBMS data
vbms Dummy variable taking the value 1 for ﬁrm years in which ﬁrms






vbms intro Dummy variable taking the value 1 for ﬁrm years in which ﬁrms
have implemented a management and control system relying on a




Dummy variable taking the value 1 for ﬁrm years in which ﬁrms
have implemented a management and control system relying on a
value-based performance metric for at least the second year in the
sample period
– " –
vbms prop Measure of external pressure to implement a VBM system cal-
culated as the annual average degree of VBMS implementation
within the industry where the ﬁrm itself is not considered, when-




Panel B: Stock return data
masr annualized 2-year market-adjusted stock return (in %), deﬁned as
the excess return of the ﬁrm’s stock compared with an investment
in a broad portfolio of German non-ﬁnancial CDAX-ﬁrms as cal-
culated by Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2010) (we eliminate observa-





rasr annualized 2-year risk-adjusted stock return (in %), deﬁned as
the excess return of the ﬁrm’s stock compared with a Carhart
(1997) equivalent investment (monthly risk factors are taken from
Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2010) and sensitivities are determined
on a 3-year estimation window; we eliminate observations with
four successive monthly return equal to zero)
– " –
Panel C: Firm characteristics




Measure of valuation level of equity deﬁned as market capitaliza-
tion of equity divided by the book value of equity (winsorized as
the 1%-level on an annual basis and undetermined for ﬁrm years




Measure of operating performance deﬁned as earnings before
taxes (EBT) deﬂated by the book value of equity (winsorized as
the 1%-level on an annual basis and undetermined for ﬁrm years
with negative book value of equity)
– " –
divers Measure of diversiﬁcation calculated as 1 minus sales (or rev-
enues) of the largest segment deﬂated by total sales (or revenues)
– " –
growth Maesure of ﬁrm growth calculated as current sales deﬂated by
sales the year before last year
– " –
intangibility Measure of intangibility of assets calculated as intangible assets
divided by ﬁxed assets
– " –
rnd-dummy Dummy variable taking the value of 1 in the case that the ﬁrm
reports research and development expenditures
– " –
rnd-ratio Measure of RnD intensity calculated as research and development
expenditures deﬂated by total sales (ﬁrms not reporting RnD ex-
penditures are treated as having zero research and development
expenditures)
– " –
leverage Leverage measure calculated as long-term debt deﬂated by total
assets
– " –
free ﬂoat Measure of free ﬂoat calculated as 1 minus percentage of voting





Notes: The table describes our variables, their deﬁnition and their sources. Stock returns are calculated using the
most liquid stock of the ﬁrm.
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